On 23 Jan, 12:10, wrote:
It is a bit daft isn't it? If they don't trust the driver to open the
doors correctly how come they trust him to drive 200 tons of train up
to 100mph?

They don't. AWS exists because they don't trust drivers to spot every
red or yellow signal. TPWS exists because they don't trust drivers to
not ignore AWS, or to approach red signals and junctions at a safe
speed. ATP exists because they don't trust drivers to stay within the
speed limit. Deadman's handles exist because they don't trust drivers
to stay conscious and/or alive. Driver vigilance devices exist because
they don't trust drivers to concentrate on the job, in the
happenstance that they are alive and conscious.

On London Underground, tripcocks exist because they don't trust
drivers to notice red signals. Correct side door enable exists because
they don't trust drivers to open doors on the right side and/or stop
the train roughly next to the platform. Rollback protection exists
because they don't trust drivers to apply the brakes if the train
starts rolling backwards down a hill,

Basically, the only things they do trust the drivers to do is not
override or disable the safety systems. As far as is possible, they
are not otherwise trusted with the safety of the train.

U