On Wed, 3 Dec 2003 18:46:52 +0000 (UTC),
wrote:

The interim report into the Camden Town derailment is available from the
link below (48 pages):

http://tube.tfl.gov.uk/content/press...n-derailment-I
nterim-Report.pdf

with a brief summary at:

http://tube.tfl.gov.uk/content/press...es/0311/28.asp

The link for the final Hammersmith derailment report is he

http://tube.tfl.gov.uk/content/press...ersmith-Invest
igation-report.pdf

although it doesn't wan to appear for some reason.
The Hammersmith report is 43 pages long.

Links to both reports are via the press release page below:

http://tube.tfl.gov.uk/content/press...p?#hammersmith



Roger
Interesting reads. Seems like the Ulta-sonic testing system only uses
90deg probes as a crack like that at Hammersmith would have been
readily identifiable once in the web using a 60 or 30. The pictures
are quite classic for slow stress corrosion cracking.

Seems like Hammersmith is showing a massive problem in Maintainance
management and communication.

The Camden one seems to me to be a bit wooly. It keeps coming back to
track lubrication with indications that may have prevented the
incident whilst keeping on noting that lubrication is only
incorporated in standards for track and wheel wear considerations.
Then states good practice wold have resulted in the blade being
lubricated. You can't have it two ways.

In my own field there are good practice things which can be hinted at
during works but have to be accepted that are not part of any
standard.

Either there should have been a recomendation there for lubrication to
be incorporated in the standards for safety, especially where wheel
lifting is a possiblity, or the point dropped out of the report. As it
is it is left hanging, which leaves a bad taste in my mouth.

You don't have to do it, but if you don't and things go pear shaped
then this report can be held against you sort of thing.

I was surprised at the involvement of the heroic part played by (by
all mentions in the report) the Rev. inspector. Seems that person was
a real hero of the hour. However, are they trained for trackside and
tunnel access? Surprised me if so and if not then definitley taking
the risk of becoming another accident statistic. Bit of a management
conundrum. Reward, ignore or retrain?

Seems from both of them that there is a problem with site management
at the scene. The management plan sems to OK(ish) when the Gold
controller is installed but quite open before. The impression I got
from the report was that the scenes became a bit of a three ring
circus for senior management to go and make like tourists before and
wander all over the forensic at will.

I would have expected that the senior operations person there, t/op,
Stn manager/whatever, should be given an automatic overall management
of the scene set in stone to regulate access/egress until the E.M.U
get there, when the EMU shift leader takes the role. They to have the
power to tell directors and the like to leave the scene. This then to
be passed to the Gold/Silver/Broze controller on arrival. Even then
the reports seem to indicate that there is a lack of enpowerment to
contol access and to the site.

Keith J Chesworth
www.unseenlondon.co.uk
www.blackpooltram.co.uk
www.happysnapper.com
www.boilerbill.com - main site
www.amerseyferry.co.uk