The Underground have long had backup safety procedures such as this in place
to work trains through sections safely in the event of signal failures. The
procedure described (trains travelling at very low speed until having passed
two known working signals) has been in place at least since the 1970s and

Well that certainly explains the delays. Is there any particular reason
for keeping
this absurd pantomime or is it just a case of the
thats-how-its-always-been-done
mentality?

B2003

Boltar wrote:
The Underground have long had backup safety procedures such as this
in place to work trains through sections safely in the event of
signal failures. The procedure described (trains travelling at very
low speed until having passed two known working signals) has been in
place at least since the 1970s and

Well that certainly explains the delays. Is there any particular
reason
for keeping
this absurd pantomime or is it just a case of the
thats-how-its-always-been-done
mentality?


Undoubtedly, with the application of different technology, there are
different ways of doing it, one such scheme was being developed for the
Jubilee Line extension. However, apart from the JLE, central Government has
starved LU of investement funds since 1984.

In article , Chris Tolley
writes
However, an efficient railway need not be unduly delayed by such a
failure. If only the signalling mechanism has failed, then it's going to
be cost-effective to dedicate a couple of staff to operating the system
the old fashioned way until the problem can be rectified.

What do you mean by "the old fashioned way" in this case?

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In article .com,
Boltar writes
The Underground have long had backup safety procedures such as this in place
to work trains through sections safely in the event of signal failures. The
procedure described (trains travelling at very low speed until having passed
two known working signals) has been in place at least since the 1970s and
Well that certainly explains the delays. Is there any particular reason
for keeping
this absurd pantomime or is it just a case of the
thats-how-its-always-been-done
mentality?

Well, I suspect that the friends and relatives of those killed in the
various collisions [+] after trains tripped past signals[*] would have
preferred that it had been done this way for longer.
[*] For some reason a number of these were on the Central Line between
Leyton and Stratford.

[+] For example, on 1953-04-08 twelve passengers were killed in a
collision just in rear of signal A491, which had failed. The driver of
the rear train failed to control his speed after tripping past A489.

--
Clive D.W. Feather | Home:
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work) | Web: http://www.davros.org
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Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

If the failure occurs in a 'controlled area', it's likely points will
need securing by hand ('remote securing' is generally confined to the
tube lines).

Response times are not helped by:

Stations that are unstaffed.
Stations with staff that are medically-restricted from going on the
track.
Stations with staff that are quite competant but whose authorising
licence is out of date.
Stations with staff that simply claim they don't feel competant to
carry out the task (this is apparently acceptable under the Health
n-Safety culture/scam of today).
Stations with staff that want traction current turned off first,
extending the delay and plunging trains into near darkness (this is
mandatory in a few restricted areas, but not at all locations).
Stations with staff unfamiliar with the area - i.e. unable to find
points concerned or who secure the wrong set, or in the wrong
direction.

Apart from that, it's all plain-sailing!

wrote in message
oups.com...
If the failure occurs in a 'controlled area', it's likely points will
need securing by hand ('remote securing' is generally confined to the
tube lines).

Is it???


Response times are not helped by:

Stations that are unstaffed.

Never come across that one as a reason for a delay regarding signal failure.
You must remember that not all signals are located next to stations. If
securing points is required a long walk can be needed.....it takes time.


Stations with staff that are medically-restricted from going on the
track.

Cant leave a station with no one competent to go on the track.....never had
this as a reason, like above.

Stations with staff that are quite competant but whose authorising
licence is out of date.

Same as above, If the licence is out of date they cant be in safety critical
areas. It does happen for various reasons, mainly being sick when Annual
Test Of Rules, (ATOR) is due. Its your responsibility to keep licence up to
date and if not done you could be stood down...no pay. Its never happened in
my experience that this has been a reason for an extended delay.

Stations with staff that simply claim they don't feel competant to
carry out the task (this is apparently acceptable under the Health
n-Safety culture/scam of today).

If anyone said that to me i'd want to know why they signed in stating they
were fit for duty. Sure, as in all workforces people do get sick on duty and
Murphy said its bound to happen as soon as this happens. You aren't
competent??? Re-training and or redeployment. BUT, would you want to go down
next to 630v with someone who says "i'm not sure about what i'm doing"

Stations with staff that want traction current turned off first,
extending the delay and plunging trains into near darkness (this is
mandatory in a few restricted areas, but not at all locations).

Turning off traction current takes seconds as does restoring it. Will not
extend a delay by more than a minute. Trains do not go into "near darkness"
as they all have battery lights in each car AND tunnel lighting comes on
automatically.
If someone wants power off....thats fine with me, its the actions after that
count. You cant frighten people into working in an area they consider
dangerous to themselves.

Stations with staff unfamiliar with the area - i.e. unable to find
points concerned or who secure the wrong set, or in the wrong
direction.

Station staff must be familiarised with the area they work every 6 months.
The people involved in going on the track would be Supervisor or Duty
Manager. These people know the area more than say barrier staff would (but
not always - but generally these are newer staff members)- Finding a set of
points is actually pretty simple - just follow the 2 silver things on the
floor. Before going on the track a briefing is held to ensure all concerned
know where they go, which points and which way. (Could save time with no
briefing but false economy and dangerous - wont happen and nor should it).
Problems start when you get to the points and they are set the wrong way -
after all thats why you are there in the first place - a failure.

Apart from that, it's all plain-sailing!

No its not. Each thing takes only minutes - but add them together and it all
adds up. And the Supervisor may be above ground on a deep tube so it all
takes time and he has a station full of people all asking questions as well.
As someone said above, then its slow speed for 2 signals and the trains back
up behind real quick.


Mal

OK - let's see. Dag East unstaffed one time when points needed
securing, Upminster LU-side left in charge of a medically-restricted
DMT who could only do the "desk", emergency lights in cars can be just
two tubes (like how dark it sometimes gets over rail gaps) - there are
no tunnel lights at night in the open of course, the supervisor ar
Rayners whom I met recently who admitted he's never been familiarised
at that location in over 2 years!!! (his fault or his DSMs? Result same
in any case!).

wrote in message
oups.com...
OK - let's see. Dag East unstaffed one time when points needed
securing, Upminster LU-side left in charge of a medically-restricted
DMT who could only do the "desk", emergency lights in cars can be just
two tubes (like how dark it sometimes gets over rail gaps) - there are
no tunnel lights at night in the open of course, the supervisor ar
Rayners whom I met recently who admitted he's never been familiarised
at that location in over 2 years!!! (his fault or his DSMs? Result same
in any case!).

Ok so you have some incidents. Can you supply dates? Was it recently or a
long time ago? Is it still the same now? If it is and you are an LU
employee, by your knowledge of these things you become complicit if you dont
report them on. So who to you ask? CIRUS is still operating albeit not quite
the same. And Im sure HMRI would be interested.
If your not LUL- get onto HMRI.
With regard to Dag East with med restricted DMT. I dont know that area at
all so i only make general comments. The 'desk' is quite capable of being
run by a med restricted person. Its not a safety critical position and
surely you must agree that the desk man can't leave - who would be available
to co-ordinate the T/Ops if he did. The last person you would want to leave
there position is the 'desk' person. Like i say - i dont know that area or
working practices, they may be different to places i am familiar with. I
dont doubt you bit perhaps we see it from different perspectives.

The Rayners SS, its his fault in the first instance, then his DSM should
also be responsible - but he cant be with them 24/7. However at the money
the SS is on surely he has the intelect to realise he needs it. Everybody
must take responsibility for there actions. He could easily be familiarised
when he takes the shift over, it does not need a manager to do it. I can
only hope you expressed your concern/disgust to him/her at the time. After
all, it could be your life in his/her hands one day.

What stock have only 2 tubes on batteries? Educate me. Again stock i know
has more than that.

You got me on the no tunnel lights in the open........been underground for
too long i think...time for a change!

Lets sort it.....
Mal

[+] For example, on 1953-04-08 twelve passengers were killed in a
collision just in rear of signal A491, which had failed. The driver of
the rear train failed to control his speed after tripping past A489.

And in other news hundreds died in Comet airliner crashes caused
by metal fatigue. Good thing we didn't keep on pressuring aircraft
and flying so high else who knows how many other people would
have died!

Are you seriously suggesting that 50 years later the controllers
still wouldn't know that there was a train on the section ahead of
a stuck signal and so to warn the driver behind?

B2003

In article .com,
Boltar writes
[+] For example, on 1953-04-08 twelve passengers were killed in a
collision just in rear of signal A491, which had failed. The driver of
the rear train failed to control his speed after tripping past A489.

Are you seriously suggesting that 50 years later

That was the date that I could find most quickly when writing that
posting. I am aware of other collisions in the same area much more
recently, but I'd have to dig through a fair amount of paper to find the
details.

the controllers
still wouldn't know that there was a train on the section ahead of
a stuck signal and so to warn the driver behind?

The driver who passed A489 knew there was probably a train ahead of him
(it could have moved off). Nevertheless he failed to control his speed
and killed 12 people as a result.

It is incidents like this that led to the introduction of Speed Control
After Trip. The specific device which you think should be removed.

--
Clive D.W. Feather | Home:
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Fax: +44 870 051 9937 | Work:
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