From:
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/transport-for-london-may-track-commuters-via-phones-to-reduce-overcrowding-b0ss982j7?shareToken=d3406a5e9a7b95fb4dd49507b8be3 071

Commuters could be tracked using their mobile phones under plans to tackle
overcrowding and increase revenue from advertising.

Transport for London (TfL) followed 5.6 million phones over four weeks
before Christmas via wifi in stations and is assessing how to develop the
monitoring system. The trial identified pinch-points in stations,
overcrowding on platforms and favoured routes around the network.

Controversially, the system could be used to sell advertising, with
companies charged more to buy space on platforms where travellers spend the
longest time.

Anonymised phone data is seen as a far more accurate way to track journeys
than entry and exit logs at barriers.

An evaluation of the trial, published today, shows that passengers used 18
routes to go between King’s Cross/St Pancras and Waterloo, the busiest
stations on the network, with 40 per cent of people who were tracked
failing to take the two fastest routes. The data showed that even within
stations a third of passengers did not use the quickest routes between
platforms and could be wasting up to two minutes.

Transport for London is assessing how best to employ the system in the
future and admitted yesterday that it could be used to track passenger
movements in “real time�.

It said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media access control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the phone cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No browsing data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of passengers
could not be shared with third parties.

Privacy campaigners expressed concern over the technology. Renate Samson,
chief executive of Big Brother Watch, said: “Analysing movements of people
via their device may provide unique analytical benefits but is still a
process of tracking and monitoring as they go about their daily business.
It is critical that the public are completely clear on what is being done,
when, how and why, and how they can opt out.�

TfL, which handles up to 4.8 million journeys a day, spent £100,000 testing
the technology in 54 stations.

Val Shawcross, deputy mayor for transport, said: “The analysis of secure,
de-personalised wifi data could enable us to map the journey patterns of
millions of passengers and understand in much greater detail how people
move around our transport network. It will provide real benefits, helping
TfL tackle overcrowding, provide more information for passengers about
their best route and help prioritise investment.�

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
From:
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/transport-for-london-may-track-commuters-via-phones-to-reduce-overcrowding-b0ss982j7?shareToken=d3406a5e9a7b95fb4dd49507b8be3 071

Commuters could be tracked using their mobile phones under plans to tackle
overcrowding and increase revenue from advertising.

Transport for London (TfL) followed 5.6 million phones over four weeks
before Christmas via wifi in stations and is assessing how to develop the
monitoring system. The trial identified pinch-points in stations,
overcrowding on platforms and favoured routes around the network.

Controversially, the system could be used to sell advertising, with
companies charged more to buy space on platforms where travellers spend the
longest time.

Anonymised phone data is seen as a far more accurate way to track journeys
than entry and exit logs at barriers.

An evaluation of the trial, published today, shows that passengers used 18
routes to go between King’s Cross/St Pancras and Waterloo, the busiest
stations on the network, with 40 per cent of people who were tracked
failing to take the two fastest routes. The data showed that even within
stations a third of passengers did not use the quickest routes between
platforms and could be wasting up to two minutes.

Transport for London is assessing how best to employ the system in the
future and admitted yesterday that it could be used to track passenger
movements in “real time�.

It said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media access control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the phone cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No browsing data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of passengers
could not be shared with third parties.

Privacy campaigners expressed concern over the technology. Renate Samson,
chief executive of Big Brother Watch, said: “Analysing movements of people
via their device may provide unique analytical benefits but is still a
process of tracking and monitoring as they go about their daily business.
It is critical that the public are completely clear on what is being done,
when, how and why, and how they can opt out.�

TfL, which handles up to 4.8 million journeys a day, spent £100,000 testing
the technology in 54 stations.

Val Shawcross, deputy mayor for transport, said: “The analysis of secure,
de-personalised wifi data could enable us to map the journey patterns of
millions of passengers and understand in much greater detail how people
move around our transport network. It will provide real benefits, helping
TfL tackle overcrowding, provide more information for passengers about
their best route and help prioritise investment.�

Let's face it. Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC address as
it is unique to each phone.

On 2017-09-08 13:18:33 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
[snip]
[TfL] said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media access control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the phone cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No browsing data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of passengers
could not be shared with third parties.
[snip]
Let's face it. Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC address
as it is unique to each phone.

You can turn it into something that can't be (realistically) turned
back into a MAC address that can be used to identify the
phone/tablet/laptop/whatever.

Sam

--
The University of Edinburgh is a charitable body, registered in
Scotland, with registration number SC005336.

On 08/09/17 15:00, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 13:18:33 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
[snip]
[TfL] said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office
about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media access
control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the phone
cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No browsing data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of passengers
could not be shared with third parties.
[snip]
Let's face it. Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC address
as it is unique to each phone.

You can turn it into something that can't be (realistically) turned back
into a MAC address that can be used to identify the
phone/tablet/laptop/whatever.

You don't have to turn the "anonymised" back to a MAC address to
de-anonymise the data. You just encrypt a MAC address and identify the
location data in just the same manner as the tracking occurs. Thus the
location can still be re-associated with the original MAC address.

There has been recent suggestions that it might become a criminal
offence to de-anonymise anonymised personal information. It seems to me
that this legislation is urgently needed.

On 2017-09-08 14:40:46 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 15:00, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 13:18:33 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
[snip]
[TfL] said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media access control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the phone cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No browsing data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of passengers
could not be shared with third parties.
[snip]
Let's face it. Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC address
as it is unique to each phone.

You can turn it into something that can't be (realistically) turned
back into a MAC address that can be used to identify the
phone/tablet/laptop/whatever.

You don't have to turn the "anonymised" back to a MAC address to
de-anonymise the data. You just encrypt a MAC address and identify the
location data in just the same manner as the tracking occurs. Thus the
location can still be re-associated with the original MAC address.

Sure, if you know a particular MAC address and the encryption procedure
and access to the location data then you may be able (and I note Dr B's
comments in his response) to recreate the key and therefore track the
MAC address. Most of us (and I again I bow to Dr B) probably can't do
that.

There has been recent suggestions that it might become a criminal
offence to de-anonymise anonymised personal information. It seems to
me that this legislation is urgently needed.

Surely the most likely people to want to do this would be criminals
anyway, so criminalising their activities seems slightly pointless.
Deterring casual peepers is probably worth doing.

Sam

--
The University of Edinburgh is a charitable body, registered in
Scotland, with registration number SC005336.

On 08/09/2017 17:34, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 14:40:46 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 15:00, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 13:18:33 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
[snip]
[TfL] said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office
about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It
said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube
network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media access
control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the phone
cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No browsing
data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of
passengers
could not be shared with third parties.
[snip]
Let's face it.Â* Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC
address as it is unique to each phone.

You can turn it into something that can't be (realistically) turned
back into a MAC address that can be used to identify the
phone/tablet/laptop/whatever.

You don't have to turn the "anonymised" back to a MAC address to
de-anonymise the data.Â* You just encrypt a MAC address and identify
the location data in just the same manner as the tracking occurs.
Thus the location can still be re-associated with the original MAC
address.

Sure, if you know a particular MAC address and the encryption procedure
and access to the location data then you may be able (and I note Dr B's
comments in his response) to recreate the key and therefore track the
MAC address.Â* Most of us (and I again I bow to Dr B) probably can't do
that.

Surely the most likely people to want to do this would be criminals
anyway, so criminalising their activities seems slightly pointless.
Deterring casual peepers is probably worth doing.

Surely the problem is if this becomes widespread as eventually you'll
get enough data to identify not just the phone but the individual.

It's fine if it's kept to the tube, but let's take the advertising
angle, presumably the advertisers won't be satisfied with just knowing
what the busiest platform is but would prefer to target their adverts to
one or more groups of people on that platform.

By hooking up a similar system with retailers they work out that of the
group on the platform at 08:30 a significant proportion are e.g.
Waitrose shoppers. And it then goes on and on until you end up pretty
much being able to identify the iindividual, what they buy, where they
live etc without actually ever using any personally identifiable
information.

I'm not sure of the relevant legislation but presumably the only way to
avoid this is that each entity having such a system has to have a
different algorithm (or at least key) for anonymising the MAC data so
each data set remains siloised (but would the supplier of the system
still be able to join the different datasets?)

In message , at 13:03:37 on Fri, 8 Sep
2017, Recliner remarked:

The data showed that even within stations a third of passengers did not
use the quickest routes between platforms and could be wasting up to
two minutes.

Assisted, no doubt, by TfL signage which frequently points to
non-optimum routes on account of fearing overloading of the optimum
route.
--
Roland Perry

In article , (Roland Perry)
wrote:

In message , at 13:03:37 on Fri, 8
Sep 2017, Recliner remarked:

The data showed that even within stations a third of passengers did not
use the quickest routes between platforms and could be wasting up to
two minutes.

Assisted, no doubt, by TfL signage which frequently points to
non-optimum routes on account of fearing overloading of the optimum
route.

Yes, choosing King's Cross is unfortunate as passengers are deliberately
directed a very long way round to get to the tube platforms there,
especially from the main line to the Victoria Line.

--
Colin Rosenstiel

On 08/09/2017 14:36, Roland Perry wrote:
In message , at 13:03:37 on Fri, 8 Sep 2017, Recliner remarked:

The data showed that even within stations a third of passengers did not use the quickest routes between platforms and could be wasting up to two minutes.

Assisted, no doubt, by TfL signage which frequently points to non-optimum routes on account of fearing overloading of the optimum route.

I have often made journeys between Waterloo and King's Cross and though I mostly use their supposedly optimum route, have one time or another used at least half-a-dozen of the other routes. The reason is usually that one hears about problems on one or more lines or stations and so diverts to an alternative which is nearly as good. It may be that TfL have only analysed data when they think that services are good on their optimum route, but customers may have other information, possibly more or less accurate than that of TfL, which persuades them to divert.


--
Clive Page

On 08/09/2017 14:03, Recliner wrote:
From:
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/transport-for-london-may-track-commuters-via-phones-to-reduce-overcrowding-b0ss982j7?shareToken=d3406a5e9a7b95fb4dd49507b8be3 071

Commuters could be tracked using their mobile phones under plans to tackle
overcrowding and increase revenue from advertising.

Transport for London (TfL) followed 5.6 million phones over four weeks
before Christmas via wifi in stations and is assessing how to develop the
monitoring system. The trial identified pinch-points in stations,
overcrowding on platforms and favoured routes around the network.

Controversially, the system could be used to sell advertising, with
companies charged more to buy space on platforms where travellers spend the
longest time.

Anonymised phone data is seen as a far more accurate way to track journeys
than entry and exit logs at barriers.

An evaluation of the trial, published today, shows that passengers used 18
routes to go between King’s Cross/St Pancras and Waterloo, the busiest
stations on the network, with 40 per cent of people who were tracked
failing to take the two fastest routes. The data showed that even within
stations a third of passengers did not use the quickest routes between
platforms and could be wasting up to two minutes.


I'm still trying to work out 18 different ways to travel between the two
by tube.


--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.