"Barry Salter" wrote in message

Just a quick note to let you know that HMRI have finally gotten round to
publishing their final report into the Chancery Lane derailment. It can
be found, as a PDF, on the HSE website. [1]

4 pages? Is that it?

M J Forbes wrote:
"Barry Salter" wrote in message

Just a quick note to let you know that HMRI have finally gotten
round to publishing their final report into the Chancery Lane
derailment. It can be found, as a PDF, on the HSE website. [1]

4 pages? Is that it?

HSE seem to have had an outbreak of common sense. All the detailed
actions that arose from the derailment were contained in the LUL report,
though that seems to have disappeared from the TfL site.

I was particularly pleased to see that HSE is taking a sensibly balanced
view about the need to consider consequential risks when taking
safety-related decisions. Here's the relevant passage, which
unfortunately omitted the initial "If" in the web version of the report:
"[If] line controllers were required, for safety reasons, to take trains
out of service in the event of unusual noises, the consequence would be
to withdraw more trains than at present, increasing consequential risks
from station and train overcrowding due to service disruption. In simple
terms, the line controller has no way of knowing whether a report of a
noise from underneath a train is a safety-related problem or not, and to
require them to withdraw every train making noises would very likely
create more risks than it would avoid. It would not be reasonable to
expect LUL to respond to unusual noises in this way, and LUL would be
correct to consider the creation of additional risks when deciding what
would be a reasonably practicable response."
--
Richard J.
(to e-mail me, swap uk and yon in address)

Unfortunately, the main (and most damning) conclusion of the report, in
my view, is that there was poor communication between the company
maintaining the rolling stock and the company operating it and the line
controllers, but that is almost invisible within the report, but if you
read the report you'll find it hidden away in the text.

That is the most damning and inevitable consequence of the dismantling
of London Transport's unified structure. In fact I take the view that
if any criminal proceedings were instituted, it would have to be
against the morons who dreamt up the new divided maintenance/operation
regime which has DIRECTLY led to this failure, and this will INEVITABLY
happen again, because that is the nature of private companies competing
with each other: a commercial unwillingness to share information that
might give a competitor an advantage.

Could one really imagine this having been a problem when the Acton
Works system was in control?!

Marc.

Unfortunately, the main (and most damning) conclusion of the report, in
my view, is that there was poor communication between the company
maintaining the rolling stock and the company operating it and the line
controllers, but that is almost invisible within the report, but if you
read the report you'll find it hidden away in the text.

That is the most damning and inevitable consequence of the dismantling
of London Transport's unified structure. In fact I take the view that
if any criminal proceedings were instituted, it would have to be
against the morons who dreamt up the new divided maintenance/operation
regime which has DIRECTLY led to this failure, and this will INEVITABLY
happen again, because that is the nature of private companies competing
with each other: a commercial unwillingness to share information that
might give a competitor an advantage.

Could one really imagine this having been a problem when the Acton
Works system was in control?!

Marc.

wrote:
Unfortunately, the main (and most damning) conclusion of the
report, in my view, is that there was poor communication between
the company maintaining the rolling stock and the company operating
it and the line controllers, but that is almost invisible within
the report, but if you read the report you'll find it hidden away
in the text.

That is the most damning and inevitable consequence of the
dismantling of London Transport's unified structure.

But Infraco BCV and the Central Line operations team were both part of
LU at the time of the accident. The problem that you refer to was that
LU had reorganised itself without ensuring that communications amd
motivations were set up properly. That can happen in any organisation,
public or private, and is a reflection on the quality of the management
that ran LU at the time.

--
Richard J.
(to e-mail me, swap uk and yon in address)

Richard,

I'd suggest the very fact that each was a separate "team" (how I
despise the terminology - as if it's some sort of sporting competition)
with different (and meaningless) names - clearly as a precursor to
privatisation - proves my point.

Were they ALL part of "London Underground" without there being any
division of loyalties, the question of communications and motivation
would hardly arise in the same way that you suggest was a feature here.
I seem to remember that in L.T. days, each "trade" was encouraged to
learn (and there were, I think, incentives to do so) as much about the
operation as a whole and not just their own narrow "team"
responsibility. It was seen as one large (amittedly paternalistic, but
I do not see that as a bad thing) "family", where the ticket collector
felt as much sense of responsibility for the smooth-running of the
service as did the man who drove the train.

I agree that good management does not depend on whether it is in the
public or private sector. My objection is not "privatisation" per se,
but the break-up of an interdependent organisation into the very
"teams" and companies (as opposed to company) that we are now landed
with.

Marc.

Richard,

I'd suggest the very fact that each was a separate "team" (how I
despise the terminology - as if it's some sort of sporting competition)
with different (and meaningless) names - clearly as a precursor to
privatisation - proves my point.

Were they ALL part of "London Underground" without there being any
division of loyalties, the question of communications and motivation
would hardly arise in the same way that you suggest was a feature here.
I seem to remember that in L.T. days, each "trade" was encouraged to
learn (and there were, I think, incentives to do so) as much about the
operation as a whole and not just their own narrow "team"
responsibility. It was seen as one large (amittedly paternalistic, but
I do not see that as a bad thing) "family", where the ticket collector
felt as much sense of responsibility for the smooth-running of the
service as did the man who drove the train.

I agree that good management does not depend on whether it is in the
public or private sector. My objection is not "privatisation" per se,
but the break-up of an interdependent organisation into the very
"teams" and companies (as opposed to company) that we are now landed
with.

Marc.

wrote:
learn (and there were, I think, incentives to do so) as much about the
operation as a whole and not just their own narrow "team"
responsibility. It was seen as one large (amittedly paternalistic, but

This is a problem in all companies today. It seems to be the lastest
trendy accounting/management technique to turn areas of companies
into small fiefdoms where managers have control over budgets
allocated by the main finance dept and each manager worries more
about his budget and his own teams performance than he does
about the company as a whole. So instead of having a well oiled
whole , you have a bunch of disparate sections fighting like cats
in a sack over money, resources and responsibilities. No doubt
one day one of the many idiot directors or CEOs who think
this is a good idea might get a clue but I'm not holding my breath.

B2003

wrote:
Richard,

I'd suggest the very fact that each was a separate "team" (how I
despise the terminology - as if it's some sort of sporting
competition) with different (and meaningless) names - clearly as a
precursor to privatisation - proves my point.

Does it? Consider these organisational functions and reporting lines:

- Operation of Central Line, reporting to Operating Manager (Railways)
- Maintenance of trains, reporting to Chief Mechanical Engineer
(Railways)
- Maintenance of lifts and escalators, reporting to Chief Mechanical
Engineer (Railways)
- Maintenance of tracks, reporting to Chief Civil Engineer
- Signalling, reporting to Chief Signalling Engineer
- Electrical power, reporting to Chief Electrical Engineer

This was the London Transport structure in 1966. The Operating Manager
(Railways) and all the Chief Engineers reported to the Chairman of LT
who was responsible for the buses as well as the tubes.

All these people worked for LT in the same way as all the people
involved in the Chancery Lane derailment worked for LUL. Looking at the
organisation chart as a family tree, the man responsible for Central
Line operation in 1966 was the "second cousin once removed" of the line
engineer responsible for maintenance of the Central Line rolling stock.
This is not exactly the integrated Utopia that you seem to be in favour
of.

Yet it worked, because of superb teamwork and common motivation. That's
down to quality of management. Obviously, once the departments are in
different *companies*, then the situation is different and indeed more
difficult, especially with the imposition of PPP contracts. But that
wasn't in place at the time of the Chancery Lane derailment.

--
Richard J.
(to e-mail me, swap uk and yon in address)

On 18 Mar 2006 08:02:26 -0800, "
wrote:

Unfortunately, the main (and most damning) conclusion of the report, in
my view, is that there was poor communication between the company
maintaining the rolling stock and the company operating it and the line
controllers, but that is almost invisible within the report, but if you
read the report you'll find it hidden away in the text.

That is the most damning and inevitable consequence of the dismantling
of London Transport's unified structure. In fact I take the view that
if any criminal proceedings were instituted,

Why would such proceedings be started?

it would have to be
against the morons who dreamt up the new divided maintenance/operation
regime which has DIRECTLY led to this failure, and this will INEVITABLY
happen again,

I assume the direct and inevitable aspects of the above are simply your
view and not something that is substantiated in the report?

because that is the nature of private companies competing
with each other: a commercial unwillingness to share information that
might give a competitor an advantage.

I don't understand your point about competition. No two companies are
competing to maintain the Central Line fleet.

Could one really imagine this having been a problem when the Acton
Works system was in control?!

You clearly have no idea as to the quality of items from Acton Works.

You also have a romantic view as to what happens under *any* form of
control. Anyone in any structure can make a mistake which can lead to
derailments or worse.

--
Paul C


Admits to working for London Underground!