tim..... wrote:
But even in countries that are pro rail such schemes are
developed piecemeal, it's the way that finance works.

Not always. Look at the TGV system in france. It was a large scale
project from the start, not some penny pinching piecemeal attempt of
building a few miles of fast track to start off with then leaving it
for a decade and have endless "reviews" from quangos which is what any
British government would have probably done.

B2003

Tom Anderson wrote:
On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, Dave Arquati wrote:

Boltar wrote:
Paul Corfield wrote:

http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/press-cent...t.asp?prID=984


"Transport for London (TfL) has announced that MTR Laing and Go-Via
have been selected to submit a 'best and final offer' for the
contract to run London Overground services on the integrated North
and East London Railways, under the management of TfL."

Why can't TfL just run it themselves? Why does it have to be sub
contracted out?

Why should they run it themselves? Doing so would be unlikely to bring
many benefits. The concession approach is similar to the running of
the DLR, which has a phenomenal track record, and it allows a
performance incentive and penalty regime to be installed so that the
concessionnaire is continually motivated in the right direction. You'd
be unlikely to get that sort of drive if TfL ran it themselves.

Because, as we well know, everyone who works for TfL is an incompetent,
unprofessional, disinterested jobsworth who has no interest in actually
providing a decent service to the public.

Oh, no, hang on a minute ...

Hmm, you abused my point a bit there :-)

I should clarify - TfL could operate an adequate service on London
Overground. They could even operate a high-quality one if they tried
hard enough (shock horror). However, the incentivised concessionaire
will *have* to deliver a high-quality service if it wants to survive.

The adage comes to mind about the rabbit escaping from the fox, because
the rabbit is running for his life whereas the fox is only running for
his dinner.

Pity there wasn't a bit more vision and willpower with the ELL.

If, in the 1980s, someone had asked for £1.5bn to build a 40km light
railway network throughout the derelict docklands of East London, they
would have been laughed out of the Treasury - but by 2012, that will
be the investment in and scale of the DLR.

Three cheers for the DLR! And one day, possibly, three car trains!

tom



--
Dave Arquati
www.alwaystouchout.com - Transport projects in London

On Sat, 16 Dec 2006 15:49:03 +0000, Dave Arquati wrote:

The whole point of a penalty/incentive regime is that the need to make a
profit forces the concessionaire to deliver high performance - because
if they don't, they will lose money and eventually have to give way to a
more efficient company.

The difficulty running the service publicly is precisely the one you
just pointed out for a private company. Will the public sector employees
deliver a high performance service just because they have a warm, fuzzy
feeling about working for the public? Some of them may, but certainly
not all. On the other hand, the concessionaire will have to run a
high-performance service because if they don't, they will be penalised.

There have been plenty of cases of companies deciding it's more
profitable to make substantial cutbacks and pay the penalties for poor
performance than it is to perform well. Whilst it's true that when the
contract expires the company may have to give way to a better
performing one, you're underestimating the preference for short term
profit over long term viability - particulary with train operating
companies, which own very few assets and make very little investment
(e.g. all their trains are owned by someone else and leased, and a
full complement of staff is often TUPE'd in ready-made) and can be
brought into and out of existence with relative ease.

I don't buy the maxim that private companies always run things better
than the public sector. There are plenty of counterexamples
(Railtrack, Connex, Multiplex, etc). At the end of the day there are
good and bad private companies, and good and bad public entities. TfL
has always struck me as a good one (though perhaps I'm mistaken ,
and I'd be more confident if they were running the Overground rather
than potentially a bunch of cowboys.

On Sun, 17 Dec 2006 14:48:13 +0000, asdf
wrote:

On Sat, 16 Dec 2006 15:49:03 +0000, Dave Arquati wrote:

The whole point of a penalty/incentive regime is that the need to make a
profit forces the concessionaire to deliver high performance - because
if they don't, they will lose money and eventually have to give way to a
more efficient company.

The difficulty running the service publicly is precisely the one you
just pointed out for a private company. Will the public sector employees
deliver a high performance service just because they have a warm, fuzzy
feeling about working for the public? Some of them may, but certainly
not all. On the other hand, the concessionaire will have to run a
high-performance service because if they don't, they will be penalised.

There have been plenty of cases of companies deciding it's more
profitable to make substantial cutbacks and pay the penalties for poor
performance than it is to perform well. Whilst it's true that when the
contract expires the company may have to give way to a better
performing one, you're underestimating the preference for short term
profit over long term viability - particulary with train operating
companies, which own very few assets and make very little investment
(e.g. all their trains are owned by someone else and leased, and a
full complement of staff is often TUPE'd in ready-made) and can be
brought into and out of existence with relative ease.

I would tend to agree with these comments. There is no such thing as the
perfect contract and inevitably circumstances will arise that will test
the arrangements in ways neither party could envisage. While the
general thrust of a contractual arrangement may very well deliver good
results these may not be sustained over time but you only find out when
it is too late (unless you have some very effective measurement and
surveillance processes in place). It is all too easy for incentives to
be wrongly pitched so that sub optimal decisions end up being taken
which either result in appalling short term performance and
renegotiation or apparent good short term performance but with an asset
base or workforce that is good for nothing long term. The only entity
that really suffers is the customer and not the supplier.

The other importance aspect is the age of the infrastructure. DLR and
Tramlink are both relatively new and have modern systems in place to
track asset condition and performance. LU and Network Rail have a
backlog of decades of degradation, lack of knowledge and under
investment to deal with. It makes a lot of difference in overall
performance terms and how well a contract works - "risk" is easier to
manage when knowledge is better.

I don't buy the maxim that private companies always run things better
than the public sector. There are plenty of counterexamples
(Railtrack, Connex, Multiplex, etc). At the end of the day there are
good and bad private companies, and good and bad public entities. TfL
has always struck me as a good one (though perhaps I'm mistaken ,
and I'd be more confident if they were running the Overground rather
than potentially a bunch of cowboys.

Again I agree - there are good and bad in both sectors. With the
Overground operation there are a few factors that I would be concerned
about if I was involved in trying to run the new arrangements.

a) disputes between the concessionaire and TfL over rolling stock
performance / reliability.
b) the role of Network Rail who are supplying the track and
signals.
c) the cultural inheritance of taking over what are in almost all
cases "cinderella" parts of the network and the need to meld a new
operational culture and deal with the pay and pensions issues
effectively.
d) the impact of the political importance of the Overground network
needing to "work" almost from day one. This will undoubtedly be
exploited by a number of parties and could cause all sorts of issues.

I'm really keen for the whole project to work but I can see it being a
bit of a bumpy ride.
--
Paul C


Admits to working for London Underground!

On Sat, 16 Dec 2006, Dave Arquati wrote:

Tom Anderson wrote:
On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, Dave Arquati wrote:

Boltar wrote:
Paul Corfield wrote:

http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/press-cent...t.asp?prID=984

"Transport for London (TfL) has announced that MTR Laing and Go-Via have
been selected to submit a 'best and final offer' for the contract to run
London Overground services on the integrated North and East London
Railways, under the management of TfL."

Why can't TfL just run it themselves? Why does it have to be sub
contracted out?

Why should they run it themselves? Doing so would be unlikely to bring
many benefits. The concession approach is similar to the running of the
DLR, which has a phenomenal track record, and it allows a performance
incentive and penalty regime to be installed so that the concessionnaire
is continually motivated in the right direction. You'd be unlikely to get
that sort of drive if TfL ran it themselves.

Because, as we well know, everyone who works for TfL is an incompetent,
unprofessional, disinterested jobsworth who has no interest in actually
providing a decent service to the public.

Oh, no, hang on a minute ...

Hmm, you abused my point a bit there :-)

I should clarify - TfL could operate an adequate service on London
Overground. They could even operate a high-quality one if they tried
hard enough (shock horror). However, the incentivised concessionaire
will *have* to deliver a high-quality service if it wants to survive.

I understand the theory, but am concerned about the practice - as the old
saying goes, in theory, theory and practice are the same, but in practice,
they're not. Yes, the DLR and Tramlink work well in private hands, as do
some NR TOCs, but there are plenty of bits of privatised or
semi-privatised transport infrastructure that emphatically do not. I don't
feel like we really have a good handle on what it is that makes some cases
work and others not (what was so different about Chiltern and Connex?),
which makes me wary of a rush to put the NLR into private hands. I suppose
neither of us are saying that it won't work either way, just that it could
work the other way!

tom

--
THE DRUMMER FROM DEF LEPPARD'S ONLY GOT ONE ARM!

"Tom Anderson" wrote in message
.li...

I understand the theory, but am concerned about the practice - as the old
saying goes, in theory, theory and practice are the same, but in practice,
they're not. Yes, the DLR and Tramlink work well in private hands, as do
some NR TOCs, but there are plenty of bits of privatised or
semi-privatised transport infrastructure that emphatically do not. I don't
feel like we really have a good handle on what it is that makes some cases
work and others not (what was so different about Chiltern and Connex?),
which makes me wary of a rush to put the NLR into private hands. I suppose
neither of us are saying that it won't work either way, just that it could
work the other way!


Do you not mean 'a rush to put the ELL into private hands'?
The existing parts of the NLR (the WLL and NLL) already are...

Paul S

Tom Anderson wrote:
On Sat, 16 Dec 2006, Dave Arquati wrote:

Tom Anderson wrote:
On Fri, 15 Dec 2006, Dave Arquati wrote:

Boltar wrote:
Paul Corfield wrote:

http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/press-cent...t.asp?prID=984

"Transport for London (TfL) has announced that MTR Laing and
Go-Via have been selected to submit a 'best and final offer' for
the contract to run London Overground services on the integrated
North and East London Railways, under the management of TfL."

Why can't TfL just run it themselves? Why does it have to be sub
contracted out?

Why should they run it themselves? Doing so would be unlikely to
bring many benefits. The concession approach is similar to the
running of the DLR, which has a phenomenal track record, and it
allows a performance incentive and penalty regime to be installed so
that the concessionnaire is continually motivated in the right
direction. You'd be unlikely to get that sort of drive if TfL ran it
themselves.

Because, as we well know, everyone who works for TfL is an
incompetent, unprofessional, disinterested jobsworth who has no
interest in actually providing a decent service to the public.

Oh, no, hang on a minute ...

Hmm, you abused my point a bit there :-)

I should clarify - TfL could operate an adequate service on London
Overground. They could even operate a high-quality one if they tried
hard enough (shock horror). However, the incentivised concessionaire
will *have* to deliver a high-quality service if it wants to survive.

I understand the theory, but am concerned about the practice - as the
old saying goes, in theory, theory and practice are the same, but in
practice, they're not. Yes, the DLR and Tramlink work well in private
hands, as do some NR TOCs, but there are plenty of bits of privatised or
semi-privatised transport infrastructure that emphatically do not. I
don't feel like we really have a good handle on what it is that makes
some cases work and others not (what was so different about Chiltern and
Connex?), which makes me wary of a rush to put the NLR into private
hands. I suppose neither of us are saying that it won't work either way,
just that it could work the other way!

I'll accept those odds - we'll never be wrong then!


--
Dave Arquati
www.alwaystouchout.com - Transport projects in London

On Sun, 17 Dec 2006, Paul Scott wrote:

"Tom Anderson" wrote in message
.li...

I don't feel like we really have a good handle on what it is that makes
some cases work and others not (what was so different about Chiltern
and Connex?), which makes me wary of a rush to put the NLR into private
hands.

Do you not mean 'a rush to put the ELL into private hands'? The existing
parts of the NLR (the WLL and NLL) already are...

I suppose i really mean "the rush to put he NLR back into private hands
(those of a concessionaire) immediately after having wrested it into
public hands (those of TfL) from the private hands (of Silverlink) into
which it was placed after having been pried from the cold, dead public
hands of BR (which of course snatched it from the private hands of the
LMSR in 1947 ...)".

tom

--
I do not think we will have to wait for long.