On Mon, 6 Jun 2005 19:59:40 +0100, Paul Terry
wrote:

snip the rest. Human fallibility is understandable, but to make such a
mistake when trying to recover from an emergency is a very serious error
indeed. In many professions (surgery, air traffic control, etc) such an
action would, after investigation, be likely to result in dismissal and
a review of procedures.

Will that be the case for LU?

As I said elsewhere this sort of failure will require a Formal
Investigation to be undertaken with clear actions and Board Level
tracking of those actions. It is not possible to say what will happen to
those who may be found to have made a mistake. It is all too easy to
reach a judgment from reading the daily report extract that was posted
in the preceding post. As to exactly what happened and why that will be
for the formal investigation.

Thanks for the report - but it catalogues errors more than inspiring
confidence from lessons learnt

Which is all that is to be expected for a report written for the next
day's management report. It can not and does not go into the required
level of detail for such a serious incident.
--
Paul C


Admits to working for London Underground!

tunnel and at 10.16 BT Police were advised. Formal Incident Management
(Na100) was declared with DSM Sparrow appointed Silver Control. A
special service
was introduced west of White City and east of Holborn to all
destinations.
With technical staff assessing the damage to the points, two of the
three trains 3 and 42 were authorised to work back to Lancaster Gate,
Approximately 1000 passengers were detrained to the platform by 10.45.

Why did it take 30 mins to decide to move the trains back? Why not do
this immediately? How long does it take to examine a set of points?
We're talking 1000 people here stuck in a sweatbox.

Once the points were re-secured the remaining train was worked forward
into
Marble Arch platform, detraining 500 passengers at 11.08.
Subsequently 20 passengers were reported to have been attended to by
ambulance crews.
One female having fainted aboard a train was advised to go to hospital
but
decided to continue her journey following water refreshment.

Like I said it a previous post , if it had been a hot day god knows
what
could have happened. This simply isn't good enough whatever the
reasons.
The passengers welfare should come first, they should not be treated
like a bunch of cattle than can wait for ages in unpleasent conditions
while staff faff around trying to fix a fault and hide behind their
procedures if anyone questions their approach.

B2003

Firstly, thanks to bowroaduk for the copy of the report - speaking as the
man on the platform, it's great when we get to hear the story behind the
messes we get in; being kept in the dark really adds insult to injury.

On Tue, 7 Jun 2005, Boltar wrote:

tunnel and at 10.16 BT Police were advised. Formal Incident Management
(Na100) was declared with DSM Sparrow appointed Silver Control. A
special service was introduced west of White City and east of Holborn
to all destinations. With technical staff assessing the damage to the
points, two of the three trains 3 and 42 were authorised to work back
to Lancaster Gate, Approximately 1000 passengers were detrained to the
platform by 10.45.

Why did it take 30 mins to decide to move the trains back? Why not do
this immediately?

Because it was thought that it would be possible to keep the trains going
forward. If it had been possible to resolve the problem quickly - as on
the Victoria line the other day - then it would be hugely preferable to do
that, resulting in nothing but a five minute delay, rather than to reverse
and detrain, delaying 1500 people by however long it took them to get into
the station, get off the train, then catch another, plus another several
thousand people in the trains behind them by however long it took to do
all that.

As it happened, it wasn't possible to resolve the problem quickly, it took
until about 1016 to determine this, and people suffered a longer delay
than if they'd been detrained immediately. However, it couldn't have been
known at 0926 that this would happen. The managers took a gamble, and
lost, but it was a sensible gamble.

Also, where do you get this 30 minute figure from? The interval from 1016
to 1045? That wasn't decision-making, that was the actual doing of it -
1016 is, from the sound of it, when the managers decided that they weren't
going to be able to fix the problem quickly, and ordered the reversal of
the trains; 1045 is the time by which this was completed. I don't think
that's an outrageous length of time to get 1000 people off two trains
under these conditions.

How long does it take to examine a set of points? We're talking 1000
people here stuck in a sweatbox.

The points failed at 0926; the first train was authorised to have a go at
the points at 1001. That means it took 35 minutes to diagnose the problem,
decide what to do, work a train in and out of the siding, determine that
it hadn't been fixed, switch off the power, get someone to the points, fix
the points, get him back, switch on the power and determine that
everything seemed okay to move. I don't think that's an unreasonable
amount of time.

One thing that i do wonder about, though: immediately after the failure at
0926, we're told "Initially, three eastbound trains were stalled in
section between Lancaster Gate and Marble Arch"; we find out later on that
the first is number 33, the second is number 5, and that there's one more
train behind that (we're not told the name, but from what comes later, i'd
guess it was number 3). Now, after the first train (number 33) has got
over the points and they've broken again, and the second train (number 5)
has approached the points, we're told "This train and a further two trains
were then queued in the tunnel" (the train i'm thinking is number 3, plus
what i assume is number 42). So, there are now two trains behind number 5
- implying that between in the time between the failure and number 5's
attempt at the points, a fourth train entered the section.

Why on earth was a train allowed to enter a section of tunnel leading to
points which were known to be broken, with three trains ahead of it? I
appreciate that the station supervisor at Marble Arch thought he'd solved
the problem, but until the points were in a known good state, they should
have been treated as broken. That train could have been emptied much
faster if it had been waiting at the platform, time would have been saved,
and unnecessary suffering prevented.

Also, i'm not sure what was happening with trains further back than
Lancaster Gate, but it seems to me that it would have made sense to bring
the last train in the queue back to the station as soon as the problem was
detected. If it was resolved, it could have started going forward again,
and since the time to reach Marble Arch would have been dominated by the
time taken for the queue to empty, no time would have been lost. If it had
not, it would have made detraining that little bit quicker, plus it would
have given passengers the opportunity to leave the train instead of
waiting.

Anyway, i'm sure LU will be investigating fully.

tom

--
It's the 21st century, man - we rue _minutes_. -- Benjamin Rosenbaum

Like I said it a previous post , if it had been a hot day god knows
what
could have happened.

It wasnt,so shut up your moaning,

Were you on the train ? So what you moaning for ?

In article , Tom
Anderson writes
Also, i'm not sure what was happening with trains further back than
Lancaster Gate, but it seems to me that it would have made sense to
bring the last train in the queue back to the station as soon as the
problem was detected.

Reversing a train isn't trivial. Apart from the issue of the driver
having to walk through a crowded train, you lose signal protection
because the line isn't set up for bidirectional working. So you need to
*ensure* that the next train isn't going to move even if it gets a green
signal.

In the case of the Central, reversing also means driving in Restricted
Manual, because there are no codes for that direction. Stopping the next
train is also harder, because there may be no signal between it and the
station.

Overall, it could easily take 15 to 20 minutes to get a train reversed
to the previous station.

--
Clive D.W. Feather | Home:
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work) | Web: http://www.davros.org
Fax: +44 870 051 9937 | Work:
Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

"David Hempsey" wrote in message
...
Like I said it a previous post , if it had been a hot day god knows
what
could have happened.

It wasnt,so shut up your moaning,

Were you on the train ? So what you moaning for ?


It's the only activity that gives him pleasure.

On Wed, 8 Jun 2005, Clive D. W. Feather wrote:

In article , Tom Anderson
writes

Also, i'm not sure what was happening with trains further back than
Lancaster Gate, but it seems to me that it would have made sense to
bring the last train in the queue back to the station as soon as the
problem was detected.

Reversing a train isn't trivial. Apart from the issue of the driver
having to walk through a crowded train,

Aha, i'd not thought of that!

you lose signal protection because the line isn't set up for
bidirectional working. So you need to *ensure* that the next train isn't
going to move even if it gets a green signal.

In the case of the Central, reversing also means driving in Restricted
Manual, because there are no codes for that direction. Stopping the next
train is also harder, because there may be no signal between it and the
station.

Overall, it could easily take 15 to 20 minutes to get a train reversed
to the previous station.

I see. Are you saying that they actually did what i suggested, and it's
just that this took a long time to do, or that what i suggested is a bad
idea?

If the latter, i don't (yet!) agree with you:if the line ahead is blocked,
then the train would otherwise only spend those 15 to 20 minutes sitting
in a tunnel, so you might as well start pulling it back.

How long does it take to switch from reversing to going forward again? If
it's a long time, that would matter, since deciding to reverse the train
would mean a significant delay if the blockage was cleared quickly. If
it's not a long time, then you might as well start reversing the train,
then send it forward again if the chance arises.

Interesting that both this and the H&C problem we were going over a week
ago are situations where the impact of failures was amplified by
shortcomings in signalling. Not that the signalling is broken, but if it
had been better - if there had been overlap protection on the H&C, and if
the Central line was signalled for reversible use - the effect of the
mechanical failure could have been contained far better. Of course, there
are powerful historical and economic factors shaping LU's signalling - i'm
not accusing anyone of incompetence - but it drives home how important
this stuff is to running a reliable, high-frequency railway. I hope LU
have a serious plan for transitioning the entire network to a signalling
system that isn't basically out of the 19th century, and that can handle
this sort of thing more smoothly.

tom

--
SAWING CHASING CRUNCHING ROBOTIC DEMOLITION

On Tue, 7 Jun 2005 17:58:32 +0100, Tom Anderson
wrote:

Why on earth was a train allowed to enter a section of tunnel leading to
points which were known to be broken, with three trains ahead of it? I
appreciate that the station supervisor at Marble Arch thought he'd solved
the problem, but until the points were in a known good state, they should
have been treated as broken. That train could have been emptied much
faster if it had been waiting at the platform, time would have been saved,
and unnecessary suffering prevented.

This is a guess as I've seen no other information on this incident.
Happy to be corrected by any Central Line drivers if I haven't got the
full knowledge of what happens with the Central Line in these
situations.

Policy is to try to get trains berthed in platforms if at all possible.
With the peak service on the Central it is likely you will get trains
between stations in the tunnels.

The points at Marble Arch would have been "scotched and clipped" to fix
them in the appropriate direction (i.e. for the normal line running and
not the siding). Once this was confirmed the trains then receive
instructions to move at normal speed as the line is automatically
operated. Once the first train started to move the system would then
progressively move the following trains and thus it is more than likely
that another train would end up between stations. The presumption would
be that "through running" had been restored. What no one expected was
that the points would be in the wrong position and then be clonked by
the first train through.

Also, i'm not sure what was happening with trains further back than
Lancaster Gate, but it seems to me that it would have made sense to bring
the last train in the queue back to the station as soon as the problem was
detected. If it was resolved, it could have started going forward again,
and since the time to reach Marble Arch would have been dominated by the
time taken for the queue to empty, no time would have been lost. If it had
not, it would have made detraining that little bit quicker, plus it would
have given passengers the opportunity to leave the train instead of
waiting.

The queue in such a situation would be jam all the way back to White
City as that is the next nearest turning point. Reversing trains
(i.e.back up the tunnel as opposed to crossing over to the other line)
is not a normal procedure and where there are computerised systems they
are normally set to detect reversible moves as "illogical" and to take
appropriate action to prevent such moves. As Clive said you need to take
special steps to prevent all other train movements if you decide to
reverse a train against its normal mode of operation.
--
Paul C


Admits to working for London Underground!

On Wed, 8 Jun 2005, Paul Corfield wrote:

On Tue, 7 Jun 2005 17:58:32 +0100, Tom Anderson
wrote:

Why on earth was a train allowed to enter a section of tunnel leading
to points which were known to be broken, with three trains ahead of it?

The points at Marble Arch would have been "scotched and clipped" to fix
them in the appropriate direction (i.e. for the normal line running and
not the siding). Once this was confirmed the trains then receive
instructions to move at normal speed as the line is automatically
operated. Once the first train started to move the system would then
progressively move the following trains and thus it is more than likely
that another train would end up between stations. The presumption would
be that "through running" had been restored. What no one expected was
that the points would be in the wrong position and then be clonked by
the first train through.

That's what i thought. The problem, i'd say, is that the presumption was
rather premature - it seems a little rash to declare the full restoration
of through running before any trains had actually managed to run through!

Thanks for the info, though.

Also, i'm not sure what was happening with trains further back than
Lancaster Gate, but it seems to me that it would have made sense to
bring the last train in the queue back to the station as soon as the
problem was detected. If it was resolved, it could have started going
forward again, and since the time to reach Marble Arch would have been
dominated by the time taken for the queue to empty, no time would have
been lost. If it had not, it would have made detraining that little bit
quicker, plus it would have given passengers the opportunity to leave
the train instead of waiting.

The queue in such a situation would be jam all the way back to White
City as that is the next nearest turning point.

So what happened on the day in question? We know the two trains which were
between Lancaster Gate and Marble Arch reversed and detrained, but where
did they go after that, and what happened to the trains between White City
and Lancaster Gate?

Reversing trains (i.e.back up the tunnel as opposed to crossing over to
the other line) is not a normal procedure and where there are
computerised systems they are normally set to detect reversible moves as
"illogical" and to take appropriate action to prevent such moves. As
Clive said you need to take special steps to prevent all other train
movements if you decide to reverse a train against its normal mode of
operation.

Very true.

tom

--
Remember when we said there was no future? Well, this is it.

It should be pointed out that this is only a PRELIMINARY report. It is
marked as such on the investigation. There will be further details/changes
as the investigator continues.
I think it a shame the person who posted it did not point that out to the
group.

Mal

wrote in message
oups.com...
09.26 - Marble Arch - Points Failure, passengers stuck on stalled
train. The failure of 3702 points to normalise at Marble Arch eastbound
caused
the Central Line to be suspended between White City and Holborn from
09.26
until 12.18. Initially, three eastbound trains were stalled in section
between Lancaster Gate and Marble Arch. To try to clear the fault, a
train in
Marble Arch platform was worked in and out of the sidings, however when
the
failure persisted, traction current was discharged to allow the Station

Supervisor to secure the points for through running. The London
Ambulance Service
was advised and an ambulance sent to Marble Arch as a precautionary
measure
The first stalled train (No 33), was authorised to work forward under
failure conditions into the platform at Marble Arch. Passengers having
been on
the train between stations for 25 minutes.
At 10.01, train 33 was authorised to move forward, and the Train
Operator reported a loud bang whilst traversing the points, when in the
platform
at Marble Arch. The following train, (No 5) when authorised through,
stopped short of the points reporting that they had been secured in the
wrong
position [just as a suggested can happen in the "Why does LU take so
long to deal with
a signal failure thread] This train and a further two trains were then
queued in the
tunnel and at 10.16 BT Police were advised. Formal Incident Management

(Na100) was declared with DSM Sparrow appointed Silver Control. A
special service
was introduced west of White City and east of Holborn to all
destinations.
With technical staff assessing the damage to the points, two of the
three trains 3 and 42 were authorised to work back to Lancaster Gate,
Approximately 1000 passengers were detrained to the platform by 10.45.
Once the points were re-secured the remaining train was worked forward
into
Marble Arch platform, detraining 500 passengers at 11.08.
Subsequently 20 passengers were reported to have been attended to by
ambulance crews.
One female having fainted aboard a train was advised to go to hospital
but
decided to continue her journey following water refreshment.
The service remained suspended whilst technical staff made temporary
repairs to the points and track circuits. Signalling code was
re-established and services resumed to severe delays at 12.18, with a
temporary speed
restriction in place over the damaged point work. The special service
pattern was withdrawn at 13.25 and timetable recovery commenced, with
only 2 cancellations at the 15.00 snapshot. A good serviced was
restored at
15.40, and a full service offered for the evening peak. Engineer's
train 570
was cancelled in consequence as staff worked on the points (3702)
during
engineering hours.